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Abstract: Thick aesthetic concepts such as ‘gracious’, ‘delicate’ and ‘virtuous’
are, according to the standard theory, characterised as both descriptive and eval-
uative. In the first part of this paper (I), I examine Sibley’s study of normativity
with regard to his version of thick aesthetic concepts. In the second part (II), I
concentrate on Zangwill’s recourse to Grice’s theory of implicature and the nor-
mative demands this move makes on the process. Finally (III), I develop a sketch
that shows which contextual considerations precede the selection process of thick
aesthetic concepts and how normative demands govern eventual selections.
Thick aesthetic concepts1 such as ‘gracious’, ‘delicate’ and ‘virtuous’ are, ac-
cording to the standard theory, characterised as both descriptive and evalua-
tive. In the first part of this paper (I), I examine Sibley’s study of normativity
with regard to his version of thick aesthetic concepts. In the second part (II),
I concentrate on Zangwill’s recourse to Grice’s theory of implicature and the
normative demands this move makes on the process. Finally (III), I develop a
sketch that shows which contextual considerations precede the selection pro-
cess of thick aesthetic concepts and how normative demands govern eventual
selections. On this basis, I hope to offer an alternative to the implicature
model.
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I. SIBLEY ON NORMATIVITY AND MEANING
In his essay “Particularity, Art, and Evaluation”, Sibley distinguishes three
types of evaluative terms discussed in the aesthetics literature: (1) solely eval-
uative terms, (2) descriptive merit-terms, and (3) evaluation-added property
terms, which Sibley calls thick aesthetic concepts.2 For this third category to
be relevant, Sibley assumes there must be rules for its use. This rule makes
two normative demands. First, to be descriptive, the concept must indicate
that a particular object has a particular property P. Secondly, the speaker
expresses his attitude to the quality P in forms of either appreciation or dep-
recation. When one learns the use of such concepts as ‘graceful’, ‘elegant’ or
‘garish’, one simultaneously learns that the correct application of these con-
cepts is tied to these two rules and that aesthetics is the field of application.
Sibley makes it clear that he is not in a position to seriously doubt the ex-
istence of such a class of concepts. But Sibley wonders what guarantees the
normative application of the rules? With respect to the descriptive element
he offers the following explanation: When a merit-term P (such as graceful)
is applied to a property x there must be something else which is also true of
x. There must be determining properties which, for example, allow the object
to be characterised as graceful. It is not enough, however, to observe that
a drawn line in a picture can be characterised, for example, as ‘curved’, but
rather a specific and particular form of being curved must be present. The
test of whether a particular line is to be considered graceful remains ‘an open
question to be decided by inspection’.3
It is at the boundary between ethics and aesthetics that this becomes par-
ticularly clear. While truth conditionality is possible for thick moral concepts
precisely because particular descriptions of facts (Q) about x are adequate,
from which we can infer that x is P, in aesthetics we have particular prop-
erties (Q) from which we can infer that x is P. In aesthetics the particular
properties of an object are facts which determine whether a concept is used
correctly. Rather than rely on the descriptions of others, one must look di-
rectly at the aesthetic object to decide which concepts are most appropriate.
But it is not enough to perceive a particular fact. It is furthermore necessary
to perceive the peculiarity of the fact. According to Sibley, two facts must be
perceivable, namely: (a) the property (curved) and (b) curved in a particular
way (gracefully).
If we examine Sibley’s claim that rules exist for the use of evaluation-
added property terms, we see that there are in fact a large number of them.
To summarise, these are: (1) Use the concept both descriptively and evalu-
atively. (2) The rules of use of the descriptive component are substantiated
as follows: (2a) Such concepts are used correctly if there is at least one fur-
ther property Q. (2b) This property must be perceivable. (2c) Furthermore
the particular manner of occurrence of these properties (P) must be perceiv-
able. If Q and P exist as facts, are perceivable, and (2d) do not depend on
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third party testimony, then the statement x is P is true. Thus Sibley is here
discussing the correctness conditions of aesthetic judgements with evaluation-
added property terms.
II. ZANGWILL’S PERSPECTIVE
In his 1995 essay “The Beautiful, the Dainty, and the Dumpy”, Zangwill is
particularly concerned with the question of whether thick aesthetic concepts
are intrinsically evaluative and therefore, whether their evaluative role con-
tributes anything to their meaning.4 After debating whether these two com-
ponents ought to be separated, so as to avoid this problem, Zangwill avoids
separation by proposing an alternative solution. He recommends adding the
proposition ‘that these substantive descriptions have no evaluative content
whatsoever ’.5 If such conceptual components do not generate meaning, Zang-
will realises that they fall within the scope of conversational implicatures:
‘So evaluation is not part of the content or sense of the judgement. Instead,
we infer that the person making the judgement also makes the evaluative
judgement from the use of the language in a context’.6 Zangwill thus adopts
an approach originated by Paul Grice, who considers a conversation’s impli-
catures entirely cancelable, since they do not contribute content.
What are the consequences for Zangwill’s conception of normativity of
aesthetic judgements with regard to thick aesthetic concepts? In his essay
“Aesthetic Realism I”, he discusses the problem of the normativity of aes-
thetic judgements in a different context.7 Zangwill considers Hume to have
already recognised the necessity of norms in his essay “Of the Standard of
Taste”, even though he could not offer a convincing strategy. Zangwill thinks
the same of Kant, Scruton, and Blackburn. According to Zangwill, the source
of normativity of aesthetic judgement is whether they possess real represen-
tational content, because it is this which ensures that a judgement is more
correct than a competing one. He considers this normative demand partic-
ularly applicable to the use of thick aesthetic concepts given this argument:
Aesthetic experiences represent aesthetic states of affairs, situations or facts.
In aesthetic experiences the world is represented as having genuine aesthetic
properties. We, for example as hearers, perceive sounds as if they represent
actual aesthetic properties such as ‘passion’, ‘poignancy’, ‘anger’, ‘elegance’
or ‘beauty’. This is particularly applicable to thick aesthetic concepts because
they indicate metaphysically fundamental aesthetic properties. For Zangwill,
it is clear that these are ‘properties in the world’.8
If, as per Zangwill, aesthetic facts or properties are the source of nor-
mativity, with the evaluative component—sourced out to implicatures—not
contributing anything, then evaluations fall entirely into the scope of the non-
normative. How does he justify that with regard to thick aesthetic concepts
the evaluative component of the concept does not contribute anything to its
meaning? He tries to solve this problem with the aid of an open-question argu-
321
Normativity and Thick Aesthetic Concepts
ment. If in every conceivable case it remains an open question (i.e., it cannot
be definitively settled) whether a substantial aesthetic property, represented
by a thick concept, is identified as good or bad, then one could conclude that
the evaluation is not an intrinsic part of the concept but rather falls within
the scope of implicature, which can be determined from the context.9
In Paragraph (x)10 it is, however, noted that this does not resolve the
problem completely, since it is not possible to provide a complete proof of the
non-existence of intrinsically evaluative concepts. Although this may at first
appear disappointing, Zangwill remains optimistic and offers an alternative
solution. According to this the question of whether evaluation is intrinsic is
negligible, since it is the role of thick aesthetic concepts to mediate between
non-aesthetic properties and thin aesthetic concepts, which are entirely eval-
uative. Within the bounds of this determination, Zangwill develops two ways
of mediation. Either concepts have an evaluative content and are thus intrin-
sic, and their determination is analytic. Alternatively they are not intrinsic,
and their determination is non-analytic. If we examine this argument in de-
tail, we notice that this evasive manoeuvre threatens his original strategy of
the open-question argument, which was meant to show that evaluation is not
a part of the normative with regard to meaning, but rather falls into the scope
of implicature. Zangwill hereby admits that there are in fact cases in which
no implicature exists and evaluation is thus an intrinsic factor.
Consider that he earlier stated that meaning had no evaluative part ‘what-
soever’.11 The underlying question is why Zangwill, as well as Jerold Levinson,
consider the implicature-model is so attractive. I suspect that they appreciate
it for the following reason: According to Grice, implicature can be suspended
without generating semantic anomalies. This would thus also be true for
evaluation. Zangwill is thereby reacting to thick aesthetic concepts which are
not necessarily followed by some form of evaluation. This problem is generally
termed evaluative flexibility. Levinson, who is only interested in showing that
there are no intrinsic cases, gives the following example:
Grace would seem to be aesthetically contraindicated in an
expressionist painting or sculpture of the mass executions at Babi Yar.
If so, then even gracefulness may not be, tout court, a pro tanto merit
in works of art, and the positive evaluative overtones of its attribution
to a work may be only a matter of conversational implication.12
The idea of placing evaluation in the scope of implicature does, however,
have consequences for the theory of meaning. Grice distinguishes between
conventional and conversational implicatures.13 Zangwill and Levinson favour
the second version for their approach, whereby evaluation ceases to have any
meaning-generating function and is excluded entirely from the sphere of the
conventional or the normative.14 I wish to argue the contrary, since evaluation
is tied to norms and can in certain circumstances generate meaning, all the
while acknowledging the phenomenon of evaluative flexibility.
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III. NORMATIVITY AND THICK AESTHETIC CONCEPTS
I now wish to defend three theses with regard to the use of thick aesthetic
concepts: (i) Realistic representational content is not the source of norma-
tivity, at least not if we take normativity to mean correctness with regard
to aesthetic properties. (ii) We must, in this context, use the term adequacy
rather than correctness. (iii) We can avoid resorting to conversational impli-
cature to explain evaluation if we consider normativity from the perspective
of contextual considerations. I thus examine those considerations which play
a constitutive role in selecting thick aesthetic concepts, in order to identify
norms that come into play during the selection of such concepts. In that
regard, I do not make any claims to completeness. What I propose is more
of a sketch expressed in a series of claims.
(1) In the debate surrounding the normativity of meaning and conceptual
content there is one aspect of particular significance: The status of cor-
rectness conditions. These, roughly said, give the conditions under which
one employs a concept.15 It is, however, problematic to demand, as Sib-
ley and Zangwill do, strict correctness conditions in the case of the use of
thick aesthetic concepts. Whether a concept like graceful was predicated
correctly or incorrectly is a question of context and of the intention of
the user. Even if these are sufficiently determined there still remains an
ambiguity as to whether the concept is interpreted to have been used
correctly or incorrectly. That is why I favour the term adequacy in this
context. The use of thick aesthetic concepts is subject to contextual
adequacy conditions, which have a normative character.
(2) Thick aesthetic concepts are used adequately if at least the following
contextual considerations are respected: (i) Information about the re-
cipient/audience, (a) aspiration level (e.g. scientific or unscientific), (b)
presupposed knowledge/possible contextual knowledge, (ii) the form of
expression, (a) conversation (e.g. public or private), (b) the form of
the text (e.g. review, critique), (c) the medium used (e.g. newspaper,
internet, television; regional/national), (iii) possible fields of use of the
description: (a) acts, (b) landscapes, (c) attitudes or characters of indi-
viduals, (d) architecture, (iv) possible forms of evaluation: (a) positive,
(b) negative, (c) no evaluation, (d) suspension of the form of evalua-
tion/change of opinion, (v) the purpose of expression (e.g. to convince
or to describe), (vi) the object of the aesthetic investigation: (a) artistic
performance (e.g. theatre or ballet), (b) musical performance (e.g. opera,
musical, concert), (c) painting, (vid) sculpture.
(3) These categories have a pivotal function when it comes to concept selec-
tion.
Example: A critic who is reviewing a ballet for a national newspaper with
an upmarket audience will: resort to a sophisticated non-scientific lan-
guage, use terminology appropriate to an aesthetic investigation, bring
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knowledge of different types of texts, have an intention to convince the
reader of his opinion of the piece, be informed of the various concep-
tual possibilities of evaluation, and know which thick aesthetic concepts
should be applied.
(4) Contextual considerations are accompanied by normative demands.
Example: (I) Use language appropriate to the audience. (II) Take into
consideration that written texts, as opposed to conversations, do not of-
fer the possibility of non-verbal communication. (III) Adjust the form of
expression to the medium or type of text. (IV) Consider three modes and
two additional rules when using thick aesthetic concepts: Such concepts
can be accompanied by either (i) a positive or (ii) a negative evaluation.
There are cases in which such concepts are used (iii) purely descriptively.
Thick aesthetic concepts are flexible with regard to evaluation. (For ex-
ample if one describes the playing of a violinist as virtuosic, one could be
referring to his technical finesse. An outstanding technical performance
can, however, be considered unfeeling and flat and thus be assessed neg-
atively.) One of the three modes (i), (ii) or (iii) must necessarily be
applied. (V) Decide whether something is to be described or an audience
is to be convinced of an opinion, since thick aesthetic concept should be
used evaluatively in acts of persuasion. (VI) Adjust the choice of concept
to the object of aesthetic investigation.
(5) Contextual considerations have an intentional character since a purposive
decision must be made.
Example: If one has the purpose of evaluating the aesthetic actions of
an actress appearing in a play in the context of a review for a specialist
website and uses thick aesthetic concepts to do so, then one decides not to
describe a landscape, which can be seen painted in oils at an art gallery.
(6) The contextual considerations and their accompanying norms precede
concept use and are thus constitutive for it.
(7) On the consequential level two socio-normative constraints come into use:
(i) Rule of license: Use a concept only when it is adequate to the contex-
tual considerations and their accompanying norms. (ii) Rule of sanction:
The violation of these conditions results in certain sanctions.
Example: If the above critic writes the review in the terminology of a
technical instruction manual and thus violates the norms underlying the
different types of text, he will most likely be sanctioned through his piece
not being accepted for publication. If, on the other hand, the review re-
spects the underlying norms it may be accepted for publication. In that
case the critic is licensed.
(8) Presupposing this model, one is not forced to take a stance on whether
evaluation is intrinsic to thick aesthetic concepts or the relationship is an
extrinsic one, such as implicature. From the perspective of an investiga-
tion of the normativity of this class of concepts it becomes clear that the
selection of adequate concepts depends on rules determined by the given
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context. Description and evaluation thus fall—among other categories—
within the scope of the normative. The distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic thus becomes superfluous and one escapes the many problems
inherent to the use of the implicature model.
(9) If evaluation falls within the scope of the normative, then it frequently
is a meaning-generating component. There are however cases in which
concepts such as ‘graceful’ or ‘delicate’ are used purely descriptively. This
depends on the context and the intention. In descriptive use no contri-
bution to the generation of meaning is made.
IV. CONCLUSION
If one accepts the rules of use of thick aesthetic concepts proposed by Sibley,
then one is obligated to accept that evaluation is a part of the normative.
From Zangwill’s perspective this is problematic precisely because one then
has to explain whether description and evaluation can be isolated from one
another as two separate components or not. Zangwill’s solution is to banish
evaluation to the realm of conversational implicature. It turns out however
that Zangwill is not able—and doesn’t really want—to show that the evalu-
ative component is not part of the meaning in all possible cases.
The solution sketched in this paper does not assume, as Sibley does, that
the descriptive and evaluative components are sufficient to explain the use
of concepts in this context. Furthermore the question of isolation is treated
as immaterial. It is only contextual considerations and their accompanying
norms that can explain which processes precede the use of thick aesthetic
concepts. Thereby it is, however, also shown that these go far beyond de-
scriptive and evaluative considerations. Contextual considerations on the one
hand encompass description and evaluation. On the other hand, they fall en-
tirely within the scope of the normative because they are tied to certain rules
which determine the use of concepts. Such a solution has, at the same time,
consequences for the theory of meaning of thick aesthetic concepts. Whether
evaluation is a part of the meaning depends on the context and on the inten-
tion of the concept user. Evaluation is a variable component, for or against
which one can decide to be, depending on the context.
kai-uwe.hoffmann@uni-jena.de
NOTES
1. I use the term thick aesthetic concepts
here, even though Sibley and Zangwill
each resort to different terminology.
2. Sibley 2001, first published in 1974.
3. Sibley 2001, 97.
4. Zangwill 1995.
5. Zangwill 1995, 322.
6. Zangwill 1995, 322.
7. Zangwill 2005.
8. Zangwill 2013, 206.
9. If a concept is intrinsically evaluative then,
according to Zangwill, the evaluation is
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part of the [meaning].
10. Cf. Zangwill 1995, 324.
11. Cf. Zangwill 1995, 322.
12. Levinson 2006, 318, fn. 13.
13. Cf. Grice 1989, 25.
14. It is not for this reason alone that the
recourse to implicature is problematic.
Grice’s theory has been questioned on nu-
merous occasions. Cf. for example, the
work of Davis 1998, Lepore and Stone
2015, Pinker 2007 and Saul 2010. It re-
mains to be examined to what extent those
difficulties persist for the recourse to Grice
with regard to thick aesthetic concepts.
15. Boghossian 1989, Blackburn 1984, 281 and
Miller 1998, 281, for example, are of the
view that correctness conditions represent
normative demands.
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